<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" ><generator uri="https://jekyllrb.com/" version="3.9.5">Jekyll</generator><link href="https://torservers.net/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" /><link href="https://torservers.net/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" /><updated>2025-09-23T13:45:06+02:00</updated><id>https://torservers.net/feed.xml</id><title type="html">torservers.net</title><entry><title type="html">Coordinated raids of Zwiebelfreunde at various locations in Germany</title><link href="https://torservers.net/blog/2018-07-04-zwiebelfreunde-raid/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Coordinated raids of Zwiebelfreunde at various locations in Germany" /><published>2018-07-04T00:00:00+02:00</published><updated>2018-07-04T00:00:00+02:00</updated><id>https://torservers.net/blog/zwiebelfreunde-raid</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://torservers.net/blog/2018-07-04-zwiebelfreunde-raid/"><![CDATA[<p><strong><em>Update July 10th: Last week Monday, prosecution stated that they will keep our things for further analysis, even <a href="https://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Massive-CCC-Kritik-an-Polizei-Hausdurchsuchung-bei-Datenschutz-Aktivisten-4098764.html">after explicitly confirming to journalists that they are aware that our only connection to Riseup is the collection of donations</a>. This includes items belonging to our partners, and other third parties like companies we work for. That same Monday, after the AfD party convening, our lawyers filed for immediate sealing and suspension of analysis until a court decision. Everything else is pending on that, and for now it looks like there are no further legal steps we can take (yet). The two of us who have not been interviewed yet (because they were not present during the raids) have been asked to give further testimony, which they will do during this week, together with our lawyers. This is not over.</em></strong></p>

<hr />

<p>On June 20th, police raided five locations across Germany, nicely coordinated
at 6:00 in the morning: The private homes of all three board members, Jens, Juris
and Moritz, our registered headquarters in Dresden (a lawyer’s office), and the
home of a previous board member.</p>

<p><strong>Please check the bottom of this page for links to various press reports about these raids detailing what happened. We will update that section regularly.</strong></p>

<p>The brief summary is that a German left-wing blog “Krawalltouristen” (ruckus tourists) 
called for protest actions around the right-wing AfD party convening in Augsburg, Germany. Law enforcement argues that this includes calls for violence.</p>

<p>The German police were interested in finding the authors of said blog, and deemed
it appropriate to not ask for information or go after the email provider the blog 
happened to be using, riseup.net, but after the German entity Zwiebelfreunde.</p>

<p>Zwiebelfreunde has a partnership with Riseup Labs, a US non-profit, and 
manages donations via European wire transfers for the Riseup collective. We spend the money in collaboration with the 
collective on software development, travel reimbursements, and for Riseup’s Tor infrastructure.</p>

<p>We will update this post as the story evolves. For more details, please see publications by other media.</p>

<h2 id="what-data-is-affected-and-how">What data is affected, and how?</h2>

<p>First of all, here’s a list of things we have strong reason to believe are <strong>not affected</strong>, and can still be considered safe:</p>

<ul>
  <li>any Torservers related infrastructure: Tor relays, mail servers, web servers</li>
  <li>any of Riseup’s infrastructure (because we have nothing to do with that)</li>
  <li>cryptoparty.in or other cryptoparty related infrastructure</li>
  <li>PGP keys, SSH keys, OTR keys etc</li>
</ul>

<p>They seized most of our electronical storage equipment (disks, laptops, PCs, GnuPG Smartcards/Yubikeys), 
but it is safe to assume that they will <em>not</em> be able to break the encryption (or the smartcards).
They also took our mobile phones, but even if they were to break into them, no
login data or anything else affecting our infrastructure or communications is stored on those phones.</p>

<p>We nevertheless revoked our shared contact PGP key, and will replace more and more keys and passphrases over time. Our new key is <a href="https://zimmermann.mayfirst.org/pks/lookup?op=get&amp;search=0x74A312092938F2F0">0x74A312092938F2F0</a>, signed by our previous key.</p>

<h2 id="so-what-is-affected">So, what <em>is</em> affected?</h2>

<p>Apart from encrypted media, they had the legal right to seize documents related
to our Riseup bank account starting from January 2018. They also went and got those
from our bank, the GLS Gemeinschaftsbank. However, we have to keep records and receipts of <em>all</em> expenditures for tax reasons. These documents were “safely” kept in a secure fire-proof safe.</p>

<p>Despite our protests, they additionally seized <strong>all</strong> printed documents relating to our own and partner projects since the inception of the association in 2011.</p>

<p>This includes highly sensitive personal data of donors, identities of activists
that received reimbursements or payments, and a list of our members.</p>

<p><strong>If you have ever donated to Torservers, or Tails or Riseup via a European bank transaction, your data is very likely now in the hands of the German police.</strong> (IBAN account number, name of account holder, amount and date)</p>

<p>We did everything in our power to avoid a data breach like this, and are now doing everything we can to fight it:</p>

<ol>
  <li>
    <p>Our lawyers kindly asked for our equipment back. Most of the equipment does not
belong to Zwiebelfreunde, and some of it is not even ours. They refused. We are 
now going to court over this.</p>
  </li>
  <li>
    <p>The warrant lists specific items. This was not respected.</p>
  </li>
  <li>
    <p>We argue that even the original warrants and seizures were clear overreach, and that this was used as an excuse to get access to member data and donor data. We have nothing to do with Riseup’s infrastructure. During the raids, the police forces clearly gave the impression that they knew we had nothing to do with either
Riseup or the “ruckus tourist” blog. None of us had even heard of that blog before!</p>
  </li>
</ol>

<p>We are grateful for the quick and unbureaucratic financial support by <a href="https://www.renewablefreedom.org/">Renewable Freedom Foundation</a>, the logistical support of the <a href="https://www.ccc.de/">Chaos Computer Club</a>, and all the kind offers of help by various communities. Thank you!</p>

<p>If you’re not afraid to donate to accounts that are probably being monitored, you can still do so, at <a href="https://www.torservers.net/donate.html">https://www.torservers.net/donate.html</a>.</p>

<h1 id="press-coverage">Press Coverage</h1>

<h2 id="english">English</h2>

<ul>
  <li><strong>4.7.2018 <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/german-police-raid-homes-of-tor-linked-groups-board-members/">ZDnet: German police raid homes of Tor-linked group’s board members</a></strong></li>
  <li><strong>4.7.2018 <a href="https://riseup.net/en/about-us/press/zwiebelfreunde">Riseup: Bavarian raids</a></strong></li>
  <li><strong>4.7.2018 <a href="https://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2018/hausdurchsuchungen-bei-vereinsvorstanden-der-zwiebelfreunde-und-im-openlab-augsburg">CCC: Police searches homes of „Zwiebelfreunde“ board members as well as „OpenLab“ in Augsburg</a></strong></li>
  <li>4.7.2018 <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/government/german-police-accused-of-carrying-out-some-pretty-stupid-raids/">BleepingComputer: German Police Accused of Carrying Out Some Pretty Stupid Raids</a></li>
  <li>5.7.2018 <a href="https://tails.boum.org/news/zwiebelfreunde_raided/index.en.html">Tails: Police raid at Zwiebelfreunde: Donor data compromised</a></li>
  <li>5.7.2018 <a href="https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/05/tor-linked-nonprofit-raided-by-police/">Naked Security : Tor-linked nonprofit raided by police</a></li>
  <li>5.7.2018 <a href="https://all3dp.com/4/german-police-raid-augsburg-fablab-confiscate-3d-printed-atom-bomb/">All3DP: German Police Raid Augsburg Fablab, Confiscate 3D Printed “Atom Bomb”</a></li>
</ul>

<h2 id="dutch">Dutch</h2>

<ul>
  <li>4.7.2018 <a href="https://www.security.nl/posting/568638/Duitse+inval+bij+privacystichting+raakt+TorServers+en+Tails">security.nl: Inval Duitse politie bij privacystichting raakt TorServers en Tails</a></li>
  <li>4.7.2018 <a href="https://tweakers.net/nieuws/140575/ccc-uit-kritiek-op-optreden-duitse-politie-bij-doorzoeking-leden-tor-vereniging.html">tweakers.net: CCC uit kritiek op optreden Duitse politie bij doorzoeking leden Tor-vereniging - IT Pro - Nieuws</a></li>
</ul>

<h2 id="french">French</h2>

<ul>
  <li>5.7.2018 <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2018/07/05/en-allemagne-serie-de-perquisitions-chez-des-defenseurs-des-libertes-numeriques_5326367_4408996.html">Le Monde: En Allemagne, série de perquisitions chez des défenseurs des libertés numériques</a></li>
  <li>5.7.2018 <a href="https://www.lediligent.com/2018/07/05/la-police-allemande-aurait-abuse-de-son-pouvoir-lors-de-descentes-contre-les-associations-zwiebefreunde-et-ccc/">La police allemande aurait abusé de son pouvoir lors de descentes contre les associations Zwiebefreunde et CCC</a></li>
</ul>

<h2 id="portugese">Portugese</h2>

<ul>
  <li>4.7.2018 <a href="https://gus.computer/blog/2018/07/04/acao-policial-coordenada-contra-a-associacao-zwiebelfreunde-em-varias-localizacoes-na-alemanha/">Ação policial coordenada contra a associação Zwiebelfreunde em várias localizações na Alemanha</a></li>
</ul>

<h2 id="spanish">Spanish</h2>

<ul>
  <li>6.7.2018 <a href="https://www.lamarea.com/2018/07/06/policia-alemana-requisa-datos-activistas-anonimato-electronico/">La Marea: La policía alemana requisa datos sensibles de activistas del anonimato electrónico</a></li>
  <li>7.7.2018 <a href="https://www.eldiario.es/tecnologia/privacidad/Policia-alemana-activistas-europeos-privacidad_0_790221250.html">El Diario: La Policía alemana incauta datos de miles de activistas y mecenas europeos de la privacidad digital</a></li>
</ul>

<h2 id="japanese">Japanese</h2>

<ul>
  <li>5.7.2018 <a href="https://japan.cnet.com/article/35121975/">cnet Japan: ドイツ警察、匿名ネットワーク「Tor」に関わる組織の幹部を家宅捜索</a></li>
</ul>

<h2 id="luxembourgish">Luxembourgish</h2>

<ul>
  <li>6.7.2018 <a href="https://moien.lu/zwiebelfreunde-police/">Moien.lu: D’Zwiebelfreunde an Däitschland geroden an d’Viséier vun der Police</a></li>
</ul>

<h2 id="danish">Danish</h2>

<ul>
  <li>9.7.2018 <a href="https://www.version2.dk/artikel/tysk-privacy-gruppe-ransaget-politi-ting-intet-havde-at-goere-med-1085640">Tysk privacy-gruppe ransaget af politi for ting, den intet havde at gøre med</a></li>
</ul>

<h2 id="greek">Greek</h2>

<ul>
  <li>8.7.2018 <a href="https://www.void.gr/kargig/blog/2018/07/08/%cf%83%cf%85%ce%bd%cf%84%ce%bf%ce%bd%ce%b9%cf%83%ce%bc%ce%ad%ce%bd%ce%b5%cf%82-%ce%ad%cf%86%ce%bf%ce%b4%ce%bf%ce%b9-%cf%84%ce%b7%cf%82-%ce%b1%cf%83%cf%84%cf%85%ce%bd%ce%bf%ce%bc%ce%af%ce%b1%cf%82/">Συντονισμένες έφοδοι της αστυνομίας στο μη κερδοσκοπικό οργανισμό Zwiebelfreunde σε διάφορες περιοχές της Γερμανίας</a></li>
</ul>

<h2 id="german">German</h2>

<ul>
  <li><strong>4.7.2018 <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/hausdurchsuchungen-bei-netzaktivisten-chaos-computer-club-kritisiert-polizeivorgehen-a-1216463.html">Spiegel Online: Hausdurchsuchungen bei Netzaktivisten: Chaos Computer Club kritisiert Polizeivorgehen</a></strong></li>
  <li><strong>4.7.2018 <a href="https://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/augsburg/Als-der-Staatsschutz-ins-Augsburger-Open-Lab-kam-id51549741.html">Augsburger Allgemeine: Als der Staatsschutz ins Augsburger “Open Lab” kam</a></strong></li>
  <li>4.7.2018 <a href="https://www.ccc.de/de/updates/2018/hausdurchsuchungen-bei-vereinsvorstanden-der-zwiebelfreunde-und-im-openlab-augsburg">CCC: Hausdurchsuchungen bei Vereinsvorständen der „Zwiebelfreunde“ und im „OpenLab“ Augsburg</a></li>
  <li><strong>4.7.2018 <a href="https://netzpolitik.org/2018/zwiebelfreunde-durchsuchungen-wenn-zeugen-wie-straftaeter-behandelt-werden/">Netzpolitik.org: „Zwiebelfreunde“-Durchsuchungen: Wenn Zeugen wie Straftäter behandelt werden</a></strong></li>
  <li>4.7.2018 <a href="https://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Massive-CCC-Kritik-an-Polizei-Hausdurchsuchung-bei-Datenschutz-Aktivisten-4098764.html">heise: Massive CCC-Kritik an Polizei: Hausdurchsuchung bei Datenschutz-Aktivisten</a></li>
  <li>4.7.2018 <a href="https://www.golem.de/news/zwiebelfreunde-polizei-durchsucht-raeume-von-tor-aktivisten-1807-135310.html">Golem: Zwiebelfreunde: Polizei durchsucht Räume von Tor-Aktivisten</a></li>
  <li>4.7.2018 <a href="https://blog.fefe.de/?ts=a5c2755c">Fefe’s Blog: “ein vorsätzlicher Terroranschlag der deutschen Behörden gegen unbeteiligte Zivilisten”</a></li>
  <li>4.7.2018 <a href="https://www.thueringer-allgemeine.de/web/zgt/leben/detail/-/specific/Polizeirazzia-bei-einem-Jenaer-Zwiebelfreund-1803079321de/web/zgt/leben/detail/-/specific/Polizeirazzia-bei-einem-Jenaer-Zwiebelfreund-1803079321">Thüringer Allgemeine: Polizeirazzia bei einem Jenaer „Zwiebelfreund“</a></li>
  <li>4.7.2018 <a href="http://www.sueddeutsche.de/news/service/internet---muenchen-hausdurchsuchungen-bei-netzaktivisten-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-180704-99-12679">Sueddeutsche: Hausdurchsuchungen bei Netzaktivisten- Service-News</a></li>
  <li>4.7.2018 12:06 <a href="https://www.hitradio-rtl.de/beitrag/generalstaatsanwaltschaft-muenchen-durchsucht-raeume-von-zwiebelfreunden-dresden-543123/">Hitradio RTL Sachsen: Generalstaatsanwaltschaft München durchsucht Räume von Zwiebelfreunden Dresden</a></li>
  <li>4.7.2018 12:40 <a href="https://www.finanzen.ch/nachrichten/aktien/Zwiebelfreunde-Polizei-durchsucht-Raeume-von-Tor-Aktivisten-6353716">finanzen.ch: Zwiebelfreunde: Polizei durchsucht Räume von Tor-Aktivisten</a></li>
  <li>4.7.2018 13:57 <a href="https://www.derstandard.de/story/2000082817115/chaos-computer-club-uebt-scharfe-kritik-an-hausdurchsuchungen-bei-netzaktivisten">der Standard: Chaos Computer Club übt scharfe Kritik an Hausdurchsuchungen bei Netzaktivisten</a></li>
  <li>4.7.2018 15:20 <a href="https://www.welt.de/regionales/bayern/article178746102/Hausdurchsuchungen-bei-Netzaktivisten.html">Die Welt: Hausdurchsuchungen bei Netzaktivisten</a></li>
  <li>4.7.2018 15:28 <a href="https://www.t-online.de/digital/id_84061404/netzaktivisten-aeussern-kritik-an-polizei-aktion.html">T-Online Digital: Netzaktivisten äußern Kritik an Polizei-Aktion</a></li>
  <li>4.7.2018 <a href="https://www.br.de/nachrichten/schwaben/inhalt/vor-afd-parteitag-augsburger-computer-tueftler-in-polizeigewahrsam-100.html">BR Schwaben: Wegen Spendenaufrufs: Vor AfD-Parteitag: Augsburger Computer –Tüftler in Polizeigewahrsam</a></li>
  <li>4.7.2018 16:46 <a href="http://www.haz.de/Nachrichten/Medien/Netzwelt/Zwiebelfreunde-Hausdurchsuchungen-bei-Netzaktivisten">Hannoversche Allgemeine: Zwiebelfreunde: Hausdurchsuchungen bei Netzaktivisten</a></li>
  <li>4.7.2018 17:03 <a href="https://www.merkur.de/bayern/nach-aufruf-zur-gewalt-bei-afd-parteitag-hausdurchsuchung-bei-netzaktivisten-10006569.html">Münchner Merkur: Nach Aufruf zur Gewalt bei AfD-Parteitag: Hausdurchsuchung bei Netzaktivisten</a></li>
  <li>4.7.2018 <a href="https://piratenpartei-bayern.de/2018/07/04/schwere-grundrechtseingriffe-bei-zeugen-durch-polizei-und-staatsanwaltschaft-sind-nicht-hinnehmbar/">Piratenpartei Bayern: Schwere Grundrechtseingriffe bei Zeugen durch Polizei und Staatsanwaltschaft sind nicht hinnehmbar</a></li>
  <li>4.7.2018 <a href="https://www.die-linke-thl.de/index.php?id=28481&amp;no_cache=1&amp;tx_news_pi1[news]=33516&amp;tx_news_pi1[controller]=News&amp;tx_news_pi1[action]=detail">Die Linke: König-Preuss kritisiert Razzien bei „Zwiebelfreunden“. Fraktion im Thüringer Landtag</a></li>
  <li><strong>5.7.2018 10:19 <a href="https://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/augsburg/Staatsschutz-durchsucht-Augsburger-Open-Lab-Eine-fragwuerdige-Aktion-id51557846.html">Augsburger Allgemeine: Kommentar Jan Kandzora: Staatsschutz durchsucht Augsburger “Open Lab”: Eine fragwürdige Aktion. “Das OpenLab sollte prüfen lassen, ob die Durchsuchung rechtmäßig war”</a></strong></li>
  <li>5.7.2018 11:12 <a href="https://motherboard.vice.com/de/article/d3kamq/polizei-hausdurchsuchung-tor-aktivist-moritz-bartl-zwiebelfreunde-open-lab-augsburg">VICE Motherboard: Polizisten gehen rabiat gegen Tor-Aktivisten vor, als sie chemische Formeln in seinem Büro entdecken</a></li>
  <li>5.7.2018 <a href="https://mdb.anke.domscheit-berg.de/2018/07/schutz-der-privatsphaere-ist-ein-grundrecht-und-kein-verbrechen/">Anke Domscheit-Berg: Schutz der Privatsphäre ist ein Grundrecht und kein Verbrechen</a></li>
  <li><strong>5.7.2018 <a href="https://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/pressemitteilungen/meldung/solidaritaet-mit-netzaktivisten/">Reporter ohne Grenzen: Solidarität mit Netzaktivisten der Zwiebelfreunde</a></strong></li>
  <li>5.7.2018 17:12 <a href="https://www.thueringen24.de/jena/article214769957/Gefahr-fuer-AfD-durch-Fuck-Bomb-Razzia-auch-in-Thueringen.html">Thüringen24: Gefahr für AfD durch Fuck-Bomb? Razzia auch in Thüringen</a></li>
  <li>5.7.2018 <a href="http://taz.de/Kommentar-Razzien-bei-Netzaktivisten/!5515912/">taz: Kommentar Razzien bei Netzaktivisten: Gezielte Einschüchterung</a></li>
  <li>5.7.2018 <a href="https://netzpolitik.org/2018/reporter-ohne-grenzen-solidarisiert-sich-mit-zwiebelfreunden/">netzpolitik.org: Reporter ohne Grenzen solidarisiert sich mit Zwiebelfreunden</a></li>
  <li>12.7.2018 <a href="https://www.piratenpartei.de/2018/07/12/justizministerkonferenz-soll-hausdurchsuchungen-bei-netzaktivisten-beraten/">Piratenpartei Deutschland: Justizministerkonferenz soll Hausdurchsuchungen bei Netzaktivisten beraten</a></li>
  <li>13.7.2018 <a href="https://motherboard.vice.com/de/article/8xba7g/polizei-zwingt-netzaktivisten-zur-offnung-ihres-safes-und-gelangt-an-geheime-spenderliste">VICE Motherboard: Polizei zwingt Netzaktivisten zur Öffnung ihres Safes und gelangt an geheime Spenderliste</a></li>
</ul>

<h3 id="audio">Audio</h3>

<ul>
  <li>4.7.2018 17:44 <a href="https://www.freie-radios.net/89823">Radio Z: Bundesweite Hausdurchsuchungen wegen E-Mail-Adresse</a> (interview)</li>
  <li>5.7.2018 12:25 <a href="https://rdl.de/beitrag/beschlagnahme-bei-riseup-tor-und-tails-support-netzwerk-und-ccc-nahen-openlab-augsburg">Radio Dreyeckland/Chaosradio Freiburg: Beschlagnahme bei Riseup, Tor und Tails Support Netzwerk und CCC nahen Openlab in Augsburg</a> (interview)</li>
  <li>6.7.2018 <a href="https://logbuch-netzpolitik.de/lnp260-eine-hausdurchsuchung-kommt-selten-allein">Logbuch Netzpolitik LNP260: Eine Hausdurchsuchung kommt selten allein</a></li>
</ul>

<h3 id="video">Video</h3>

<ul>
  <li>4.7.2018 <a href="https://www.br.de/nachrichten/schwaben/inhalt/vor-afd-parteitag-augsburger-computer-tueftler-in-polizeigewahrsam-100.html">BR24: Wegen Spendenaufrufs: Vor AfD-Parteitag: Augsburger Computer –Tüftler in Polizeigewahrsam</a></li>
</ul>]]></content><author><name>moritz, juris, qbi</name></author><category term="blog" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Update July 10th: Last week Monday, prosecution stated that they will keep our things for further analysis, even after explicitly confirming to journalists that they are aware that our only connection to Riseup is the collection of donations. This includes items belonging to our partners, and other third parties like companies we work for. That same Monday, after the AfD party convening, our lawyers filed for immediate sealing and suspension of analysis until a court decision. Everything else is pending on that, and for now it looks like there are no further legal steps we can take (yet). The two of us who have not been interviewed yet (because they were not present during the raids) have been asked to give further testimony, which they will do during this week, together with our lawyers. This is not over.]]></summary></entry><entry><title type="html">Tor exit node operator arrested in Russia - a solidarity Tor Relay Challenge launched</title><link href="https://torservers.net/blog/2017-04-14-freebogatov-relaymob/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Tor exit node operator arrested in Russia - a solidarity Tor Relay Challenge launched" /><published>2017-04-14T00:00:00+02:00</published><updated>2017-04-14T00:00:00+02:00</updated><id>https://torservers.net/blog/freebogatov-relaymob</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://torservers.net/blog/2017-04-14-freebogatov-relaymob/"><![CDATA[<p><strong>Run a Tor relay or exit node in solidarity with Dmitry Bogatov!</strong></p>

<p>On April 12, Russia celebrated Yuriy Gagarin’s first flight in space. In the
meanwhile, a young Russian scientist, mathematician and FOSS activist Dmitry
Bogatov spends the Space Day in detention center. His involvement in
decentralized web projects, his interest to privacy and anonymity, his
activities as an administrator of tor exit node have brought him under
suspicion of the FSB. Accused of “incitation to terrorism” because of some
messages posted from his IP address, he will stay detained till June 8 at
least, and risks up to 7 years in prison if the Investigation committee
‘proves’ his guilt.</p>

<p><img src="/assets/img/freebogatov.png" alt="Free Dmitry Bogatov" /></p>

<p>Though, the very nature of Bogatov case is a controversial one, as it mixes
technical and legal arguments, and makes necessary both strong legal and
technical expertise involved. Indeed, as a Tor exit node operator, Dmitry does
not have control and responsibility on the content and traffic that passes
through his node: it would be the same as accusing someone who has a knife
stolen from her house for the murder committed with this knife by a stranger.
In the past other exit node operators in Russia had conversations with police.
For example, Sergey Matveev aka <a href="http://www.stargrave.org/Contacts.html#Contacts">Stargrave</a> been witnessing several times
on the cases related to the crimes commited under his IP adress (mostly,
related to financial fraud and hacking). Though, as Sergey states himself, he
“has never been accused, but was only a witness”, as his cases were not related
to “<a href="https://geektimes.ru/post/287944/#comment_9998470">extremism</a>” On
2016-02-02 his devices were seized for 2 weeks for inspection but he has never
been detained, after explaining to the police how <a href="https://lists.cypherpunks.ru/pipermail/cryptoparty/2016-February/000111.html">Tor actually works</a>.</p>

<p>Russia counts 230.000 Tor users everyday and only 46 exit nodes. Tor is
extremely popular after a bunch of laws restricting usage of Internet and
enforcing the lawful interception procedures (obliging ISPs to store all
metadata for 3 years, and the traffic - even though encrypted - for 6 months).
However, the Bogatov case has had an influence on the perception of Tor by ‘end
users’. We’ve observed several group chats on Russian most popular IM app,
telegram, dedicated to anti-Putin protests: these chats gather from +500 to
+1500 users, and a lot of them use different privacy enhancing tools. The
Bogatov case was discussed widely. These discussions have shown that users do
not fully understand the difference between running a relay and an exit node,
and also between relay operators and tor browser users. They perceive Tor as
being vulnerable to deanonymization. Misunderstanding, lack of feedback from
Tor community or ‘expert’ users underrepresented in these chat rooms leads the
discussion to a very dangerous direction: “we do not care about hiding things,
because the police will anyway find everything about us - even Tor is not
secure”.</p>

<p>Tor activists have launched a flashmob - “Run a relay in solidarity with
Bogatov”. By April 13, in only 1 day, 18 new relays have been set up in
different countries, wearing names like
<a href="https://atlas.torproject.org/#search/Bogatov">freeBogatov</a> and
<a href="https://atlas.torproject.org/#search/KActionLibre">KActionLibre</a>, referring
to Bogatov’s handle famous in FOSS and GnuPG forums. Bogatov’s personal exit
node that he had been running from his own house was also wearing the ‘kaction’
name. It is the first flashmob that uses relays as form of international
solidarity and the nicknames of relays become a means to transmit a message:
Bogatov is part of the community, he is a valuable, trusted person who has been
contributing to various open source projects and is recognized as a
professional. Tor community also works on technical proof/explanations to help
users and Bogatov’s lawyers to understand that, by the very architecture of Tor
network, Bogatov can not be responsible for the things he is accused of. He
also has alibi: he was absent when the messages were published, and video
recordings from surveillance cameras are in posession of Bogatov’s lawyer.
Another proof of Bogatov’s innocence is the fact that the user continued
posting incendiary messages after Bogatov has been arrested. Also, the style
of writing, the language, orthography do not correspond to Bogatov’s style -
this can be proven by psycholinguistic expertise. However, FSB does not want to
stop the process - they investigate the version of “terrorism”, that would mean
a very hard penalty for Dmitry, and also does not correspond to technical,
legal, psychological, social situation. The judge also claimed to not trust
Dmitry because of his ‘‘high skills in new technologies’’ that may potentially
help him “erase traces of his crimes” - to prove this weird hypothesis, the
Investigation Committee has withdrawn all the technical equipment from Dmitry’s
apartment - from USB drives to laptops, smartphones and cameras…</p>

<p>If you can, run a relay or an exit node and give it a name that contains
Bogatov or KAction (Bogatov’s handle). By running more relays we
increase anonymity and also show solidarity and demonstrate the power of
shared responsibility.</p>

<h2 id="tor-relays-are-publicly-available-for-everyone-to-use">Tor relays are publicly available for everyone to use</h2>

<p>The IP addresses of the Tor relays (middle relays and exit nodes) are publicly
available and can be freely used by the tor users. The fact that relays are a
publicly available resource doesn’t minimize or threatens the anonymity of a
tor user in fact it can be used as a proof that an IP address of a server was a
Tor at a given time.</p>

<p>Currently running Tor relays are enumerated to <a href="https://atlas.torproject.org">Atlas</a>, a web application to learn about currently
running Tor relays. In a similarly way the <a href="https://exonerator.torproject.org/">ExoneraTor</a> service maintains a database of IP
addresses that have been part of the Tor network. It answers the question
whether there was a Tor relay running on a given IP address on a given date.
ExoneraTor may store more than one IP address per relay if relays use a
different IP address for exiting to the Internet than for registering in the
Tor network, and it stores whether a relay permitted transit of Tor traffic to
the open Internet at that time. Exonerator is a web service that can check if
an IP address was a relay at a given time.</p>

<p>A different type of relays; bridges are Tor relays that aren’t listed in the
public Tor directory. That means that ISPs or governments trying to block
access to the Tor network can’t simply block all bridges. Bridges are useful
a) for Tor users in oppressive regimes, and b) for people who want an extra
layer of security because they’re worried somebody will recognize that it’s a
public Tor relay IP address they’re contacting.</p>

<h2 id="further-reading">Further reading</h2>

<ul>
  <li><a href="https://www.eff.org/torchallenge/what-is-tor.html">What is a Tor relay</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq.html.en">The Legal FAQ for Tor Relay Operators</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other proxies?</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#WhatProtectionsDoesTorProvide">What security protections does Tor provide?</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https">Interactive visualization that explains various Tor/non-Tor scenarios</a></li>
</ul>

<h1 id="short-version">Short version</h1>

<p><strong>Run a Tor relay or exit node in solidarity with Dmitry Bogatov!</strong></p>

<p>Tor activists launch a call to run relays and exit nodes in solidarity with
Dmitry Bogatov, a FOSS contributor, GnuPG and privacy advocate and math teacher
arrested and detained in Russia. By now 26 relays have been set up in different
countries.</p>

<p>Bogatov will stay in detention till June 8 at least. He risks up to 7 years in
prison as he is accused of having published messages with incitations to
terrorism. A user ‘Airat Bashirov’ was indeed posting a number of messages
inciting to organize mass rallies and protests, using Bogatov’s home IP adress.
However, as a Tor exit node operator, Bogatov can not have access or be
responsible for the content that passes by: Tor’s technical architecture is in
itself a proof of his innocence.</p>

<p>As an active FOSS contributor, he also has a support from the peer community
and has a strong alibi - he was in the sport center and then in the supermarket
at the moment when the messages were published. Moreover, after Bogatov’s
arrest the same user continued posting incendiary messages.</p>

<p>If you can, run a tor relay or an exit node and give it a name that contains
Bogatov or KAction (Bogatov’s handle). By running more relays we increase
anonymity and also show solidarity and demonstrate the power of shared
responsibility.</p>]]></content><author><name>xeniax, serrObengbi, 1up</name></author><category term="blog" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Run a Tor relay or exit node in solidarity with Dmitry Bogatov!]]></summary></entry><entry><title type="html">Three servers offline, likely seized</title><link href="https://torservers.net/blog/2014-11-09-servers-disappeared/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Three servers offline, likely seized" /><published>2014-11-09T00:00:00+01:00</published><updated>2014-11-09T00:00:00+01:00</updated><id>https://torservers.net/blog/servers-disappeared</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://torservers.net/blog/2014-11-09-servers-disappeared/"><![CDATA[<p>Last Thursday we noticed that three servers went down. Those servers were used to run Tor exit nodes, 10 in total. We tried to get in contact with our providers which weren’t able to tell us anything and also could not reboot the servers nor give us access to them. On the same day it was reported that several government agencies took down hidden services. Even though our machines were only used as exit nodes,  we believe that our machines were also seized by law enforcement officials. We are
trying to get further information about the incident. As soon as we know more we will inform you.</p>

<p>At the moment all of these exit nodes are down and we advise you to not use them in case they come back. Below you’ll find a listing of all exits in question. We informed the Tor project, and at the time of writing all of these relays should already be blacklisted and not able to rejoin the network. We will not reuse the server hardware in case they become available again.</p>

<p>Amsterdam datacenter:</p>

<ul>
  <li><a href="https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/AB217D85D0AC461E98E1270F5AE404E5FD8238C8">AB217D85D0AC461E98E1270F5AE404E5FD8238C8</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/C37C070A2895414DBCEB26A911A87166420D9D51">C37C070A2895414DBCEB26A911A87166420D9D51</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/8E52195B040ADD42B9E02693CF03DAFEAD1B2C04">8E52195B040ADD42B9E02693CF03DAFEAD1B2C04</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/4024B658462568C7E21A486006BEC60B244E86D8">4024B658462568C7E21A486006BEC60B244E86D8</a></li>
</ul>

<p>Miami datacenter:</p>

<ul>
  <li><a href="https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/9EA317EECA56BDF30CAEB208A253FB456EDAB1A0">9EA317EECA56BDF30CAEB208A253FB456EDAB1A0</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/3844D45E0F7CC7FC405EAB949D6B40064565D4B7">3844D45E0F7CC7FC405EAB949D6B40064565D4B7</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/183AE7AEAD2A2FA0E8690DF0AD7C5532A70A8015">183AE7AEAD2A2FA0E8690DF0AD7C5532A70A8015</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/31347866CDD8BB3EAA79642F49891E2C3F64D386">31347866CDD8BB3EAA79642F49891E2C3F64D386</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/82AF458ADD83717D1B2E3DE258D277BD8BB7800B">82AF458ADD83717D1B2E3DE258D277BD8BB7800B</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/3B486DEC5A22694C0960B4A97A3665C617C89B1C">3B486DEC5A22694C0960B4A97A3665C617C89B1C</a></li>
</ul>

<p>The Tor Project will soon release further information about the takedown and probable explanations. <strong>EDIT 2014-11-09:</strong> Here’s <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/thoughts-and-concerns-about-operation-onymous">the Tor blog article</a>.</p>]]></content><author><name>qbi</name></author><category term="blog" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Last Thursday we noticed that three servers went down. Those servers were used to run Tor exit nodes, 10 in total. We tried to get in contact with our providers which weren’t able to tell us anything and also could not reboot the servers nor give us access to them. On the same day it was reported that several government agencies took down hidden services. Even though our machines were only used as exit nodes, we believe that our machines were also seized by law enforcement officials. We are trying to get further information about the incident. As soon as we know more we will inform you.]]></summary></entry><entry><title type="html">Reporters Without Borders and Torservers.net, partners against online surveillance and censorship</title><link href="https://torservers.net/blog/2014-04-25-rsf-press-release/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Reporters Without Borders and Torservers.net, partners against online surveillance and censorship" /><published>2014-04-25T00:00:00+02:00</published><updated>2014-04-25T00:00:00+02:00</updated><id>https://torservers.net/blog/rsf-press-release</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://torservers.net/blog/2014-04-25-rsf-press-release/"><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://en.rsf.org/reporters-without-borders-and-25-04-2014,46196.html">https://en.rsf.org/reporters-without-borders-and-25-04-2014,46196.html</a></p>

<p><strong>Reporters Without Borders and Torservers.net have joined forces to create and maintain 250 additional relays for the Tor network.</strong></p>

<p>“In doing this, our two organizations are thumbing our noses at the entire world’s censors,” said Grégoire Pouget, the head of the Reporters Without Borders New Media desk. “Whatever the technical means deployed to control information, there will always be circumvention methods that many organizations including ours will not hesitate to deploy.”</p>

<p>“Anonymity is important for the full expression and realization of civil liberties. On the Internet, safe and unmonitored communication can only be established through methods of trusted decentralized anonymizing services like the Tor network.”, added Moritz Bartl, the founder of torservers.net.</p>

<p>Tor is free software and an open network that helps to improve protection of privacy and the security of Internet communications. Using the Tor network ensures protection against a form of network surveillance known as “traffic analysis.” This type of surveillance can be used to discover who is communicating with who and, in some cases, even to identify who you are and where you are located.</p>

<p>Journalists use Tor to communicate in a safe and anonymous manner with sources, whistleblowers and dissidents. Tor can also be used to circumvent website blocking in many countries. Many Internet users in China, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey use Tor to access Facebook, YouTube and Twitter.</p>

<p>In some countries that want to monitor and control all Internet connections, public access points to the Tor network are blocked. In partnership with the Tor Project and torservers.net, Reporters Without Borders has therefore created and will maintain 250 new entry nodes to the Tor network. As these entry nodes will not be made public, authoritarian governments will not be able to block them.</p>

<p>To find an entry node if Tor is blocked in your country, you can contact the Tor Project at <a href="mailto:help@rt.torproject.org">help@rt.torproject.org</a> or Reporters Without Borders at <a href="mailto:wefightcensorship@rsf.org">wefightcensorship@rsf.org</a>.</p>

<p>Reporters Without Borders will also make the details of these non-public bridges available within its network and during the seminars on circumventing censorship and protecting communications that it organizes throughout the world.</p>

<p>Torservers.net is an independent, global network of organizations that help to protect human rights to freedom of opinion and expression by running high bandwidth Tor relays.</p>

<h2 id="contact">Contact</h2>

<p>Juris Vetra<br />
Zwiebelfreude e.V.<br />
c/o DID Dresdner Institut für Datenschutz<br />
Palaisplatz 3<br />
D-01097 Dresden<br />
Germany</p>

<p>Fax: +49-(0)911-30 844 667 48<br />
Phone: +49-(0)351-212 960 19<br />
<a href="mailto:press@torservers.net">press@torservers.net</a></p>]]></content><author><name>RSF</name></author><category term="blog" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[https://en.rsf.org/reporters-without-borders-and-25-04-2014,46196.html Reporters Without Borders and Torservers.net have joined forces to create and maintain 250 additional relays for the Tor network.]]></summary></entry><entry><title type="html">Torcollect - A tool to collect statistics from servers that run Tor bridges</title><link href="https://torservers.net/blog/2014-04-02-torcollect/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Torcollect - A tool to collect statistics from servers that run Tor bridges" /><published>2014-04-02T00:00:00+02:00</published><updated>2014-04-02T00:00:00+02:00</updated><id>https://torservers.net/blog/torcollect</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://torservers.net/blog/2014-04-02-torcollect/"><![CDATA[<p>For the last half year i’ve been developing a tool that collects metrics from bridge servers. The specified application had to extract and collect the data from
each single server that is registered in the system and generate static HTML reports from the received data.</p>

<p>Torcollect is written in Python and uses paramiko to establish ssh-connections to it’s designated servers. It also uses the module pygal to display the
recorded data graphically.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/torservers/torcollect">https://github.com/torservers/torcollect</a></p>

<p>Starting development i first developed a database scheme capable of storing all data we
need and even add a few additional features, for example the ability to store, that
certain organizations were given specific bridges, so we can create reports that only concern
the bridges of those organizations. I continued with gathering some static data, like a
complete list of countries and their abbreviations and a collection of flag images for all
of them (thanks to koppi for assembling a great image library).</p>

<p>After completing the prerequisites i wrote some code to extract data from the bridge servers.
The processing of the data is mostly done on the side of the bridge server to minimize
the amount of transported data and thus increasing performance. Doing so, I struggled a little
with the permissions that Tor enforces on it’s server files. I had to do a workaround, that
involves copying the relevant file to a location which the torcollect user has access to. This
has to happen everyday via a cronjob. I find this solution to be sufficient but not very pretty as
it complicates the process of introducing a new server to a torcollect system. Maybe someone 
from the Tor community has a better idea or I may come up with a better solution.
The data is being extraced by appropriately using grep and find. Then I wrote the “collector”, 
which is a piece of code that enters the collected datasets into the according relations in the database.</p>

<p>After having the database collecting the data, I experimented with how to display the data.
The first thing i implemented was an overall graph of the bridge usage. I implemented it in
coffeescript, which generated a svg object in the DOM and puts it into the page. After I
experimented around a bit, i discovered the pygal library, which produces very beautiful graphs
with little effort, and changed the static HTML generator to use it. Further, I experimented 
with different efforts to display so called sparklines for each object that is represented in 
the daily reports (countries, bridges, pluggable transport protocols).</p>

<p>Sparklines are a bit tricky because the graphics that are generated sum up to huge amounts
of data. This resulted in roughly 7 MiB per HTTP call even when using gzip compression, which
obviously kills responsiveness of the site. I’d love to have this feature included, because
they allow detecting sudden changes in only one glance.</p>

<p>The latest feature I added was creating monthly reports from the collected data. Those monthly
reports can be created for either the whole system or only the bridges of a single organization.</p>

<p>My further efforts will be:</p>

<ul>
  <li>Trying to create a debian package to install torcollect</li>
  <li>Simplifying the process of setting up more servers</li>
  <li>Creating a better user experience in the UI</li>
</ul>]]></content><author><name>Daniel</name></author><category term="blog" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[For the last half year i’ve been developing a tool that collects metrics from bridge servers. The specified application had to extract and collect the data from each single server that is registered in the system and generate static HTML reports from the received data.]]></summary></entry><entry><title type="html">Tor Relay Operator Meetup at 30C3</title><link href="https://torservers.net/blog/2013-12-16-30c3/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Tor Relay Operator Meetup at 30C3" /><published>2013-12-16T00:00:00+01:00</published><updated>2013-12-16T00:00:00+01:00</updated><id>https://torservers.net/blog/30c3</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://torservers.net/blog/2013-12-16-30c3/"><![CDATA[<p>Torservers.net invites Tor exit relay operators and organizations to a
meetup at this year’s Chaos Communication Congress 30c3 in Hamburg. If possible, for example if you’re a member of one of
the ‘Torservers partner organizations’, please prepare some slides on
your activities and let us know about it. We will do quick presentations on recent and future activities around Torservers.net.</p>

<p>All in all this will be a very informal meeting. If you have any questions about Tor in general, this is a good place to come by.</p>

<p>Afterwards, the official members meeting of German Zwiebelfreunde e.V.
will be held in the same room.</p>

<p><a href="https://events.ccc.de/congress/2013/wiki/Session:Tor_Relay_Operators_Meetup">https://events.ccc.de/congress/2013/wiki/Session:Tor_Relay_Operators_Meetup</a></p>

<p>Starts at: 2013/12/27 03:00:00 PM<br />
Ends at: 2013/12/27 05:00:00 PM<br />
Duration: 120 minutes<br />
Location: Hall 13<br /></p>]]></content><author><name>Moritz</name></author><category term="blog" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Torservers.net invites Tor exit relay operators and organizations to a meetup at this year’s Chaos Communication Congress 30c3 in Hamburg. If possible, for example if you’re a member of one of the ‘Torservers partner organizations’, please prepare some slides on your activities and let us know about it. We will do quick presentations on recent and future activities around Torservers.net.]]></summary></entry><entry><title type="html">Torservers awarded $250,000 by Digital Defenders</title><link href="https://torservers.net/blog/2013-12-13-hivos/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Torservers awarded $250,000 by Digital Defenders" /><published>2013-12-13T00:00:00+01:00</published><updated>2013-12-13T00:00:00+01:00</updated><id>https://torservers.net/blog/hivos</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://torservers.net/blog/2013-12-13-hivos/"><![CDATA[<blockquote>
  <p>Dresden, December 13th, 2013 — Torservers.net has been awarded
$250,000 over two years by the Digital Defenders Partnership to
strengthen and improve the Tor network, the anonymity system
crucial to journalists and human rights defenders using the Internet.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Tor is free software and an open network that helps internet users to defend against traffic analysis, a form of network surveillance that threatens personal freedom and privacy, confidential business activities and relationships, and state security. It is used by hundreds of thousands of daily users worldwide to secure their online communication, avoid tracking, and circumvent censorship.</p>

<p>Tor protects users by bouncing communications around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers all around the world: it prevents somebody watching your Internet connection from learning what sites you visit, and it prevents the sites you visit from learning your physical location.</p>

<p><strong>Torservers.net</strong> provides high bandwidth infrastructure for the Tor network since 2010. We have grown to 10 volunteer-run organizations in 8 countries. Torservers.net distributes donations and grants across independent organizations of IT security professionals, and helps build a sustainable network by teaching others how to run stable Tor infrastructure.</p>

<p>The <strong>Digital Defenders Partnership</strong> was established in 2012 to provide rapid response to threats to internet freedom. The Partnership aims at keeping the internet open and free from emerging threats, specifically in internet repressive and transitional environments. It also wants to increase and better coordinate emergency support for the internet’s critical users, such as bloggers, cyber activists, journalists and human rights defenders, whenever and wherever they are under threat.</p>

<p>Thanks to the newly awarded grant of $250,000 over two years, participating Torservers organizations will be able to sustain at least 3 Gbit/s of exit traffic, and 2000 fast and up to date bridges. Tor bridges are required in many countries with state-level censorship. 3 Gbit/s are 949 terabytes, almost a petabyte of user data, every single month, per direction.</p>

<h2 id="call-for-organizations">Call for organizations</h2>

<p>To strengthen the Tor network and prevent attackers, it is crucial to spread operation across as many groups as possible. Thanks to the Digital Defenders, Torservers.net can now extend its work and help less technical organizations with the setup and maintenance of Tor services. The Institute for War &amp; Peace Reporting (IWPR) is the first civil society organization to join the Torservers program with its Cyber Arabs group. This collaboration allows Cyber Arabs to give stable and
working Tor access to activists and journalists in the Arab world. If you are part of an organization interested in supporting Tor, please contact Torservers.net. They have various options available, and are happy to teach tech staff and journalists.</p>

<p>“Since we started Torservers.net a few years ago, Tor finally became fast enough to be used for all Internet communications” comments Moritz Bartl, co-founder of Torservers.net. “New people also join the Tor network every day. With the help of the Digital Defenders, we have the chance to make the network bigger, safer and more resilient to the benefit of everyone with the desires to protect their online activities from surveillance.”</p>

<h2 id="contact">Contact</h2>

<p>Juris Vetra<br />
Zwiebelfreude e.V.<br />
c/o DID Dresdner Institut für Datenschutz<br />
Palaisplatz 3<br />
D-01097 Dresden<br />
Germany</p>

<p>Fax: +49-(0)911-30 844 667 48<br />
Phone: +49-(0)351-212 960 19<br />
<a href="mailto:press@torservers.net">press@torservers.net</a></p>]]></content><author><name>Moritz</name></author><category term="blog" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Dresden, December 13th, 2013 — Torservers.net has been awarded $250,000 over two years by the Digital Defenders Partnership to strengthen and improve the Tor network, the anonymity system crucial to journalists and human rights defenders using the Internet.]]></summary></entry><entry><title type="html">USB Sticks for Tails</title><link href="https://torservers.net/blog/2013-11-15-usb-sticks-for-tails/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="USB Sticks for Tails" /><published>2013-11-15T00:00:00+01:00</published><updated>2013-11-15T00:00:00+01:00</updated><id>https://torservers.net/blog/usb-sticks-for-tails</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://torservers.net/blog/2013-11-15-usb-sticks-for-tails/"><![CDATA[<p>Ideally, you use TAILS from a read-only medium. CD is best, but many
devices these days don’t have an optical drive, and handling CDs is not
as convenient as a USB stick.</p>

<p>For quite some time, people kept recommending the <a href="https://geizhals.de/trekstor-cs-8gb-50324-a240853.html">TrekStor CS USB stick
</a>, one of the
few sticks available in Germany with write-protection switch. Turns out
they use a new firmware, and now don’t support booting from it in
read-only mode. The company confirmed this via email.</p>

<p>There are roughly no alternatives, and I figured I’m not the only one
looking for USB sticks with write protection switch. Via alibaba.com, a
“wholesale Chinese ebay”, I contacted various Chinese suppliers, and
ended up ordering two samples. Even there, the selection of sticks with
write protection is very limited.</p>

<p>I ended up paying paying 60€ for the 2 samples because of shipping and
Western Union fees.</p>

<p>The sticks are not very fast, but acceptable, and boot in read-only
mode. They are not as slim as I hoped for, but the supplier is friendly,
production and shipping was very fast. (less than 2 weeks altogether).</p>

<p>Logo printing is cheap ($0.15 per stick), so to try the quality I also
had them print a logo on the samples.</p>

<p>I am still undecided whether I want the final sticks to have a logo, or
simply be blank to not attract too much attention. If you have a nice
idea for a logo, let me know. I want to order 100 sticks in time for
Chaos Communication Congress 30C3. The production cost is $4 per stick
(8GB), the final price (taxes, GEMA, shipping) will likely be around $15.</p>

<p>Pictures: <a href="http://share.pho.to/48Egt">http://share.pho.to/48Egt</a></p>

<h2 id="dmesg">dmesg</h2>

<div class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge"><div class="highlight"><pre class="highlight"><code> [55679.884123] usb 2-1.2: new high-speed USB device number 5 using ehci_hcd
 [55680.051089] usb 2-1.2: New USB device found, idVendor=058f,
 idProduct=6387
 [55680.051092] usb 2-1.2: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2,
 SerialNumber=3
 [55680.051094] usb 2-1.2: Product: Mass Storage
 [55680.051095] usb 2-1.2: Manufacturer: Generic
 [55680.051096] usb 2-1.2: SerialNumber: B6BA8F3F
 [55680.051459] scsi9 : usb-storage 2-1.2:1.0
 [55681.051827] scsi 9:0:0:0: Direct-Access     Generic  Flash Disk
  8.07 PQ: 0 ANSI: 4
  [55681.053860] sd 9:0:0:0: Attached scsi generic sg1 type 0
  [55681.055544] sd 9:0:0:0: [sdb] 15937536 512-byte logical blocks: (8.16
  GB/7.59 GiB)
  [55681.056665] sd 9:0:0:0: [sdb] Write Protect is off
  [55681.056676] sd 9:0:0:0: [sdb] Mode Sense: 23 00 00 00
  [55681.057742] sd 9:0:0:0: [sdb] Write cache: disabled, read cache:
  enabled, doesn't support DPO or FUA
  [55681.176618]  sdb: sdb1
  [55681.179808] sd 9:0:0:0: [sdb] Attached SCSI removable disk
</code></pre></div></div>

<h2 id="hdparm--t-devsdb">hdparm -t /dev/sdb</h2>

<div class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge"><div class="highlight"><pre class="highlight"><code> /dev/sdb:
  Timing buffered disk reads:  54 MB in  3.07 seconds =  17.60 MB/sec
</code></pre></div></div>

<h2 id="dd-iftails-i386-021iso-ofdevsdb-bs1m">dd if=tails-i386-0.21.iso of=/dev/sdb bs=1M</h2>

<div class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge"><div class="highlight"><pre class="highlight"><code> 891+1 records in
 891+1 records out
 934471680 bytes (934 MB) copied, 170.058 s, 5.5 MB/s
</code></pre></div></div>]]></content><author><name>Moritz</name></author><category term="blog" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Ideally, you use TAILS from a read-only medium. CD is best, but many devices these days don’t have an optical drive, and handling CDs is not as convenient as a USB stick.]]></summary></entry><entry><title type="html">Upgrading ram due to large amount of user connections</title><link href="https://torservers.net/blog/2013-09-01-Upgrading-RAM-due-to-large-amount-of-user-connections/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Upgrading ram due to large amount of user connections" /><published>2013-09-01T00:00:00+02:00</published><updated>2013-09-01T00:00:00+02:00</updated><id>https://torservers.net/blog/Upgrading%20RAM%20due%20to%20large%20amount%20of%20user%20connections</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://torservers.net/blog/2013-09-01-Upgrading-RAM-due-to-large-amount-of-user-connections/"><![CDATA[<p>Our relays currently run out of RAM due to what is most likely a botnet using the Tor network ( <a href="https://metrics.torproject.org/direct-users.png">https://metrics.torproject.org/direct-users.png</a>
). It is not using much bandwidth, but a lot of circuits. Looks like its a botnet with hidden service C&amp;C server(s).</p>

<p>Thus, I have to upgrade our Gbit/s servers from 8GB to (for now) 16GB RAM. While we’re at it, we will upgrade both NFOrce servers from 100TB to unmetered, dedicated Gbit/s. (price point: 725 Euro/month for 2x1Gbit/s servers)</p>

<p>I hope 16GB RAM will be enough.</p>]]></content><author><name>Moritz</name></author><category term="blog" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Our relays currently run out of RAM due to what is most likely a botnet using the Tor network ( https://metrics.torproject.org/direct-users.png ). It is not using much bandwidth, but a lot of circuits. Looks like its a botnet with hidden service C&amp;C server(s).]]></summary></entry><entry><title type="html">Zwiebelfreunde take over popular onion.to tor gateway</title><link href="https://torservers.net/blog/2013-08-13-Zwiebelfreunde-take-over-popular-onion.to-Tor-gateway/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Zwiebelfreunde take over popular onion.to tor gateway" /><published>2013-08-13T00:00:00+02:00</published><updated>2013-08-13T00:00:00+02:00</updated><id>https://torservers.net/blog/Zwiebelfreunde%20take%20over%20popular%20onion.to%20Tor%20gateway</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://torservers.net/blog/2013-08-13-Zwiebelfreunde-take-over-popular-onion.to-Tor-gateway/"><![CDATA[<p>The non-profit organization Zwiebelfreunde e.V. is known for the “Torservers” project, which over the past years has grown into a global network of organizations that maintain server infrastructure for the open anonymization network Tor. Today, Zwiebelfreunde has taken over a very popular web gateway or Tor hidden services, onion.to.</p>

<p>Tor hidden services provide anonymity for website owners, mail providers, chat systems and other Internet services. Hidden services are designed to be accessed using Tor Browser, which additionally provides anonymity for users of the service. Web gateways such as onion.to provide a convenient way to reach hidden services using a regular browser without having to install Tor. A side effect is that the broad world of hidden services are exposed to search engines and can thus be indexed and found. The trade-off is that users lose anonymity: Both the gateway and the hidden service can track users across visits, and determine the user’s IP address. That is why Zwiebelfreunde strongly encourages people to download Tor Browser instead.</p>

<p>“By exposing hidden services to the public, we hope to attract even more users and widen the spectrum of available services within the Tor network.”, says Zwiebelfreunde founder and president Moritz. “I can imagine privacy-friendly email services to be based fully on hidden services in the future, for example.”</p>

<p>The current gateway server is located in Iceland, and another one will be added in the near future.</p>

<p><a href="https://www.onion.to/">https://www.onion.to/</a></p>

<p>An example hidden service can be found at <a href="https://duskgytldkxiuqc6.onion.to/">https://duskgytldkxiuqc6.onion.to/</a></p>

<h2 id="zwiebelfreunde-ev">Zwiebelfreunde e.V.</h2>

<p>The German non-profit association Zwiebelfreunde e.V. serves as a platform for projects in the area of safe and anonymous communication. The organization facilitates and participates in educational events about technological advances in the area of privacy, and connects professionals to spread knowledge and experience on these fields.</p>

<p>“Zwiebelfreunde” is German for “Friends of the Onion”, as a reference to Onion Routing, the name of the concept behind Tor for anonymizing communication: Messages are passed through relays that each removes one layer of encryption, like peeling the skin of an onion.
Contact</p>

<h2 id="contact">Contact</h2>

<p>Moritz Bartl
Zwiebelfreunde e.V.
c/o DID Dresdner Institut für Datenschutz
Palaisplatz 3
D-01097 Dresden
Germany</p>

<p>press@torservers.net
Tel.: +49-(0)351 / 212 960 18
Fax.: +49-(0)911 / 308 4466 748
<a href="https://www.torservers.net/">https://www.torservers.net/</a>
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/torservers/">https://www.twitter.com/torservers/</a></p>]]></content><author><name>Moritz</name></author><category term="blog" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[The non-profit organization Zwiebelfreunde e.V. is known for the “Torservers” project, which over the past years has grown into a global network of organizations that maintain server infrastructure for the open anonymization network Tor. Today, Zwiebelfreunde has taken over a very popular web gateway or Tor hidden services, onion.to.]]></summary></entry></feed>